Crump, Andrew (2022) Animal sentience science and policy. Animal Sentience
31(15)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1748

Date of submission: 2022-07-08
Date of acceptance: 2022-07-10

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2022.439: Crump on Rowan et al. on Sentience Politics

Animal sentience science and policy
Commentary on Rowan et al. on Sentience Politics

Andrew Crump
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science
London School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract: Animal sentience research cannot be divorced from its ethical and political
implications. For example, discovering which animals are sentient is vital for deciding which
require welfare protection. Two legal case-studies illustrate the importance of scientists in
such debates: the UK Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 had input from animal sentience
researchers, whereas the US Animal Welfare Act 1966 did not. The former defined sentient
animals much more plausibly than the latter. I accordingly argue that sentience researchers
should inform policy, and that this is achievable without sacrificing scientific integrity.
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In their fascinating target article, Rowan et al. (2021) describe the coevolution of animal
welfare science and policy. By commissioning the Brambell Report (1965), the UK parliament
essentially initiated welfare science. A scientific consensus has since emerged that at least
some animals are sentient, contributing to successive welfare laws acknowledging this
(Goldsworthy & Robertson, 2021; Rowan et al., 2021). However, in her thought-provoking
commentary, Marian Stamp Dawkins argues that welfare policy-making should be separated
from the science of animal sentience (Dawkins, 2022). I would disagree with Dawkins’s
fundamental objection – that scientific uncertainty justifies separating sentience science from
welfare policy – and I believe that sentience researchers should engage with policy debates.
To matter ethically, animal welfare must assume sentience (Duncan, 1996; Fraser et
al., 1997). Animal sentience research accordingly tackles scientific questions of huge ethical
and political importance. Consider the distribution question: Which animals are sentient? By
ignoring evidence for sentience, we may condemn countless sentient animals to suffer
without legal protection. Conversely, wrongly attributing sentience to non-sentient animals
could lead to unnecessary legislation that damages crucial industries, from food to
pharmaceuticals. This distribution question is a major headache for legislators trying to
recognise animals as sentient beings.
How should sentience researchers contribute to science-based policy questions such
as defining the scope of animal welfare law? Because ethical and political decisions often
demand lower evidential standards than science (Birch 2017), Dawkins warns that engaging
with these debates can tarnish researchers’ scientific integrity. This is a valid concern, but
scientific integrity does not matter only in science. Without scientific knowledge,
policymakers must rely on assumptions, biases, and human interests. These are inaccurate
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(or at least incomplete) information sources, which would compromise the scientific integrity
of any resulting legislation. Either animal sentience research gives us some additional
knowledge, in which case it should inform policy, or the field tells us nothing, in which case
it’s a useless scientific discipline. We cannot separate sentience research from policy.
Although scientists often emphasise what is still unknown, empirical research
obviously reveals some information about animal sentience (Birch et al., 2022; Paul et al.,
2020; Sneddon et al., 2014). My colleagues and I recently developed eight criteria, each of
which provides some evidence for sentience (with a focus on pain; Birch et al., 2021; Crump
et al., 2022). A key aim was to distinguish simple reflexes (an explanatory alternative to pain)
from complex and flexible responses consistent with pain experience. For example,
motivational trade-offs in hermit crabs (Appel & Elwood, 2009; Elwood & Appel, 2009) and
conditioned place preference in octopuses (Crook, 2021) are responses to injury that go
beyond simple reflexes. Such evidence isn’t proof of pain, but does increase its likelihood in
these invertebrates.
When conveyed to policymakers, this kind of scientific evidence leads to more sensible
judgements and better policy. For example, we developed our criteria for a UK government
report, which recommended regarding all cephalopod molluscs and decapod crustaceans as
legally sentient (Birch et al., 2021). The government responded by including both taxa in the
Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022. Although our report acknowledged and identified
evidence gaps, the methods were quantitative, empirical, and ultimately grounded in science.
Moreover, whilst the Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act can be criticised for other reasons (e.g.,
insects weren’t even considered for inclusion), this legislation does reflect a coherent first
approximation to answering the distribution question. Sentience research enhanced the
scientific integrity of policymaking, with potential welfare benefits for billions of cephalopods
and decapods.
Compare this to the US Animal Welfare Act of 1966, which exemplifies the perils of
science-free policy. This legislation does not use either the concept or the term “sentience,”
although the link between sentience and welfare makes the distribution question relevant to
its scope. Moreover, the Act’s definition of “animal” is infamously incoherent. A horse is
covered whilst being used for research, but that same horse would be excluded if it were at a
show. Dead hamsters are protected, but live rats are not. No animal sentience researcher
would justify such answers to the distribution question. The principles enshrined in this
legislation – that human usage affects animals’ need for protection, and that dead rodents
deserve more concern than live ones – are patently absurd. The US Animal Welfare Act is
based on human sentiment and commercial interest, to the detriment of animal welfare.
Dawkins does highlight an important issue, however: engaging with policymaking
should not compromise scientific integrity. Such an outcome would set back both sentience
research and researchers’ ability to inform future policy. To preserve scientific integrity,
sentience researchers must be transparent about the basis of their conclusions and
recommendations. Our report, for example, found “very strong evidence of sentience” in
octopuses, which we defined as satisfying seven or eight criteria. The meaning of our
pronouncement, and the evidence underpinning it, was explicit. Such openness also enables
peers to find and probe holes in our work. This, to me, is the essence of scientific rigour: one
group proposes a theory to explain empirical evidence, and others try to dispute it. As such, I
believe that animal sentience research can strengthen animal welfare policy without
compromising scientific integrity.
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